Algebraic cryptanalysis usually requires to recover the secret key by solving polynomial equations. Gröbner bases algorithm is a well-known method to solve this problem. However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks, namely, any information won't be got if we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. In this paper, firstly, a generalized model of Gröbner basis algorithms is presented, which provides us a platform to analyze and solve common problems of the algorithms. Secondly, we give and prove the degree bound of the polynomials appeared during the computation of Gröbner basis after field polynomials is added. Finally, by detecting the temporary basis during the computation of Gröbner bases and then extracting the univariate polynomials contained unique solution in the temporary basis, a heuristic strategy named Middle-Solving is presented to solve these polynomials at each iteration of the algorithm. Farther, two specific application mode of Middle-Solving strategy for the incremental and non-incremental Gröbner bases algorithms are presented respectively. By using the Middle-Solving strategy, even though we couldn't work out the final Gröbner bases, some information of the variables still leak during the computational process.
INTRODUCTION
As one of the most efficient attacks, algebraic attacks have been successful in breaking several stream ciphers, public key cryptosystems, and a few block ciphers. Algebraic attacks try to reformulate a cipher as a (very large) system of polynomial equations and then find the secret key by solving such a system. In this paper, we focus on the polynomial system solving part. The problem of solving polynomial systems over finite fields is known to be very difficult (non-deterministic polynomial-time hard complete in general). The security of many cryptographic systems is based on this problem, which makes developing algorithms for solving polynomial systems be a hot research topic in cryptanalysis.
Gröbner bases, first introduced in [1] , are by now a fundamental tool for tracking this problem and become a powerful method for algebraic attacks. In addition, Gröbner bases can be used to determine optimal equations in terms of degree and/or variables in the algebraic attacks. What's more, Albrecht and Cid [2] use Gröbner bases algorithms to perform a consistency check. This allows them to determine whether given pair satisfies the considered differential characteristic. Cryptanalysis involving the Gröbner bases algorithms has been claimed to attack many cryptosystems: multivariate public key cryptosystems such as HFE [3] , Minrank [4] , McEliece [5] , stream ciphers such as Bivium [6] , hash function such as SHA-1 [7] .
Finding Gröbner bases is a difficult task, which requires lots of computational resources. Algorithms to compute Gröbner bases have evolved a great deal since the first one was proposed in 1965 by Bruno Buchberger [1] . A significant leap in performance was achieved with the introduction of the F4 [8] and F5 [9] algorithms by Jean-Charles Faugè re. In fact, F4 and F5 can be regarded as the two sides of Faugère's algorithm: F4 algorithm uses Gaussian elimination to speed up the time-consuming step of"critical pair" reductions. F5 algorithm uses a powerful criterion to remove useless critical pairs. In recent years, many new variants of F5 are proposed and discussed, for example, F5R [10] , Matrix-F5 [11] , SAGBI-F5 [11] , F5C [12] , F5B [13] , F4/5 [14] , EF5 [15] , G2V [16] , GVW [17] , GVWHS [18] and many other algorithms.
In recent years, Gröbner bases algorithms developed rapidly and their computational efficiency has improved significantly. But if we apply them to cryptanalysis, we need to consider the actual needs of cryptanalysis. In cryptanalysis, any information leakages may result in serious threat to cryptosystems. However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks, namely, we won't get any information if we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. In this paper, firstly, a generalized model of Gröbner basis algorithms is presented, which provides us a platform to analyze and solve common problems of the algorithms. Secondly, we give and prove the degree bound of the polynomials appeared during the computation of Gröbner bases after field polynomials is added, which provides a theoretical basis for the subsequent study. Finally, by detecting the temporary basis during the computation of Gröbner basis and then extracting the univariate polynomials contained unique solution in the temporary basis, a heuristic strategy named Middle-Solving is presented to solve these polynomials at each iteration of the algorithm. Farther, two specific application mode of Middle-Solving strategy for the incremental and non-incremental Gröbner bases algorithms are presented respectively. By using the Middle-Solving strategy, even though we couldn't work out the final Gröbner bases, some information of the variables still leak during the computation process. We must stress that the heuristic strategy of Middle-Solving has never been applied to Gröbner bases algorithms until now. Experiments have been presented to demonstrate that the Middle-Solving strategy has the ability to improve the practical of Gröbner bases algorithms drastically.
The paper is structured as follows. First we do some preliminaries in Sect. 
GRÖBNER BASES AND BUCHBERGER ALGORITHM
This section describes the fundamental notations and the conventions in this paper. We briefly give the main definitions needed to define a Gröbner bases in a characterization useful for our purpose and simply describe the algorithm for computing Gröbner bases. 
Assume that algorithms, a generalized model of Gröbner bases algorithm is described in algorithm 3.1.
:
return poly(G)
The all existing Gröbner bases algorithms can be described under the framework of algorithm 3. 
. If some criteria are used, the S-polynomials satisfing the criteria in the set of ) -(, S polynom l F a G i could be deleted. 
THE UPPER BOUNDS FOR THE DEGREE OF POLYNOMIALS APPEAR IN GRÖBNER BASES ALGORITHM
For cryptographic purpose, solutions in the algebraic closure are irrelevant for us. Usually, only solutions over the finite fields are of importance. In Gröbner bases algorithm, a potential way to deal with this issue is to try to adjoin the set of field equations to the list of equations that we want to solve. For a polynomial ring R=Fq [X] we can write the set of field equations of the form x q +x=0 for all xX  , where In fact, the strategy which taking the field equations into account for Gröbner bases algorithm has also been used previously. We mention it here, it is just because we want to discuss the regular for the degree of polynomials, monomials and variables appear during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithm after adding the field equations. According to the proof of Lemma 4.1, it is easy to know that the degree of every variables in the leading term of S-polynomials reduced completely in temporary bases or final output Gröbner bases is lower than q,and the degree of every variables in the leading term of field polynomials is q. The polynomials appear during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithm can be divided into S-polynomial, reductor and the polynomials in the temporary bases or final output Gröbner bases. Next, we will discuss the upper degree bound of these polynomials. 
where f and g are taken from the temporary bases. Case a. If both f and g are S-polynomials reduced completely in the last round, then the degree of every variables in () LM f and () LM g is lower than q. It is easy to know that the degree of every variables in
So the highest degree of ( ( 
. By adjoining the set of field polynomials
to the initial polynomial ideal, the maximal degree of all polynomials appear during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithm is at most 1 n  .
MIDDLE-SOLVING GRÖBNERBASES ALGORITHM
In this section, we will slightly modify the logic of the Gröbner bases algorithms to make them be more practical for cryptanalysis (especially algebraic attacks) to solve cryptosystems over finite fields.
Let initial polynomial ideal
A Gröbner bases for a lexicographical order (Lex) of a zero-dimensional system (i.e. with a finite number of solutions) has the following shape
Theorem 5.1 [20] If the solutions of By adjoining the set of field polynomials to the initial polynomial ideal, Gröbner bases algorithms can be controlled to run at a low degree. In particular, the upper bound for the degree of polynomials in the temporary bases is just 1 n  after adjoining the set of field polynomials (2) . By detecting the polynomials in the temporary bases during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithm, we have observed there are some univariate polynomials that had only one solution appear in the temporary bases. They are just treated like other polynomials in the Gröbner bases algorithms. Due to the limitation of time or memory, if we couldn't work out the final Gröbner bases, unfortunately, then these polynomials can't be found.
At this time we will get nothing about the solutions. However, these polynomials can provide part of the value of the solutions, so they should be deserved a special treatment during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithms.
To solve this problem, we add a detection algorithm into Gröbner bases algorithm to search those univariate polynomials that had only one solution in the temporary bases during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithm. If exists, solve these univariate polynomials and back-substitute the values of the solved variables. Once a value of variable is obtained, the following operation is equivalent to computing
Gröbner bases with respect to the unsolved variables. We name the heuristic strategy
CONCLUSION AND FUTRUE WORK
In order to overcome the serious drawback of the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks that no information leak if we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system, a heuristic strategy named Middle-Solving strategy is presented in this paper. Experimentally, Middle-Solving strategy can effectively discover the univariate polynomials during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithm and then output the values of the solved variables. It indicates that even though we couldn't work out the final Gröbner bases, some information of the variable still leak during the computation process. So this heuristic strategy is well adapted for algebraic attacks on cryptosystems.
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